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JUDGE MERRYDAY: We will consider this afternoon the issue of plea
agreements and cooperation agreements. It is a difficult subject. It is one
that has, I think, the central attention of the subcommittee that is
considering privacy issues, particularly in the area of criminal practice.
From the vantage of our research, it is clear that many mechanisms are in
place around the United States, based on similar but different operational
principles. There is a variation in degree of satisfaction and confidence in
those mechanisms, so we wanted to investigate an array of them.
We will do so in two panels, the first panel consisting of practitioners and
academics, and the second panel of judges.

* United States District Court Judge, Middle District of Florida.
1. Professor, Georgia State University College of Law.
2. Professor, Brooklyn Law School.
3. United States Attorney’s Office, District of Maryland.
4. Correctional Programs Division, Bureau of Prisons.
5. Partner, Covington & Burling LLP.
6. Federal Defenders of New York.
7. Partner, Arguedas, Cassman & Headley, LLP.
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We will begin with a presentation from Professor Caren Morrison, of
Georgia State University.
PROF. MORRISON: Thank you very much.
Internet access to criminal case records in general, and to plea
agreements and cooperation agreements in particular, poses several
difficulties. The first and most obvious is that it raises the fear of retaliation
against cooperators. The second is that it may deter some individuals from
cooperating in the first place. Third, and probably most importantly, these
two concerns may encourage prosecutors, who are apprehensive of their
cooperators getting hurt or of losing important sources of evidence, to take
steps to limit the damage before their fears are realized, even if their
concerns are overblown.
So concerns triggered by Internet access may drive prosecutors to hide
what they are doing, either by over-relying on sealing, masking the kinds of
deals that they make with cooperators, either by using charge bargaining or
hiding sentencing facts from probation departments and courts, or avoiding
filing plea agreements in the first place.
An important backdrop to the whole issue is that use of cooperating
defendants is far from transparent. It is a law enforcement mechanism that
is difficult to regulate, susceptible to arbitrary application, and seems to
result in wide disparities in the treatment of defendants. So increasing
meaningful information about how the government chooses and rewards
cooperators is an important goal.
For these reasons, I suggest that the Committee consider limiting Internet
access to criminal court records on PACER to the parties and to the court,
and not having these files be accessible to the general public except in paper
form at the courthouse. But in addition, I propose that the Committee
require the government to provide detailed data on plea and cooperation
bargains and sentencing in the aggregate.
Before I get into specifics, I want to make clear several underlying
premises on which I am basing my proposal.
The first is that the fundamental role of public access to court records is
to enable the informed discussion of public affairs and, in particular, to
allow the public to understand what the government is doing. These are the
purposes that Judge Raggi spoke about in her remarks this morning. These,
in turn, will enhance public confidence in the system and allow increased
public oversight.
The second is that any solution ultimately reached must not result in a net
loss of information to the public or in the alteration of the character of that
information. At a minimum, my proposal assumes that the public will
continue to have access to court records at the courthouse to the same extent
that the public did in the past.
Further, any solution that treats cooperator files differently from noncooperator files will raise a red flag, and in so doing, is going to identify the
cooperators. So any solution that seals only cooperation agreements and
not plea agreements, for example, will do little to protect cooperator
security.
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In addition, identification of cooperators is not limited to plea documents.
Sentencing memoranda—in particular, substantial assistance motions filed
by the government—are just as revealing. So are motions to adjourn
sentencing until all related defendants’ cases have been resolved. Even the
docket sheet itself frequently reveals cooperation. If, for example, there are
a lot of sealed entries or an unnaturally long delay between plea and
sentencing, anybody who is familiar with the system will recognize that that
is typically the file of the cooperator.
Prosecutors are well aware of these facts, and they will do whatever they
feel is necessary to protect the safety of their cooperators. This can lead
them to alter the way they conduct their business. So the practice of signing
up and rewarding cooperators, which is already fairly opaque, can become
even more so as prosecutors become concerned that their cooperators are in
danger.
Finally, I think sealing documents is a poor solution, for a couple of
reasons. First of all, sealing is not supposed to be a permanent or blanket
solution. Sealing is supposed to be used in exigent circumstances and for
limited periods of time only.8 It is not meant to be used automatically in
every case in which someone cooperates. Second, in an online context,
there is a strong disincentive to unseal anything. Once something is
unsealed, it immediately becomes available to an enormously wide public,
and so prosecutors and defense lawyers representing cooperators will not be
in any hurry to do so. Once again, this is contrary to the legal purposes of
sealing, which is supposed to be a short term solution, ending once the
exigency has passed.
As I said, the first part of what I am suggesting is to try to curb
unwarranted exposure of cooperators by limiting access to the docket sheets
and the case documents on PACER to the parties and to the court. This
would leave all non-sealed documents still available at the courthouse.
Obviously, this kind of restriction on online access would need
exceptions, particularly in high-profile cases or cases of heightened public
interest, such as public corruption cases. That would help to answer the
issues raised by the Salvatore Gravano or Bernie Madoff-type cases, where
obviously there is going to be high newsworthiness content. In those cases
it would make more sense, given the amount of publicity they generate, that
the records be available online. In such cases, I think the district courts
should have the flexibility, with input from the parties, to allow the public
to access these cases on PACER, on a case-by-case basis.
But for the vast majority of run-of-the-mill cases which involve
cooperators, such as narcotics cases, where the potential risks to the
cooperators are high and the news value is low, I am not certain that there is
that much public benefit from having those cases posted online.

8. See, e.g., United States v. Cojab, 996 F.2d 1404, 1405 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that the
power to seal documents “is one to be very seldom exercised, and even then only with the
greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very clear and apparent reasons”).
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This proposal might seem restrictive, but it actually would not result in a
net loss of information to the public—at least not any more of a loss than
there is already in a paper world. My concern with the solutions devised by
the districts of North Dakota and New Hampshire, which have the virtue of
treating cooperators and non-cooperators alike, is that they completely
obscure the information about whether defendants are cooperating or not.
In addition, they give the public no information whatsoever about what the
terms of the cooperation agreements may be.
A system in which every plea agreement looks alike and everything is
accompanied by a sealed plea supplement is misleading and fails to inform
the public of what its government is doing. Worse, the public will be
denied that information at the courthouse as well, as there is no access to
sealed records. I think that solutions that provide protection to defendants
by obscuring government action do run contrary to the purposes of public
access.
So the second part of my proposal is that there really has to be a way of
delivering information to the public so that it can understand how many
defendants the government is cooperating with and the magnitude of the
benefit given to those defendants compared to non-cooperating defendants.
In my view, it is more important for the public to know exactly what kind
of trades the government is making with individual cooperators than it is for
them to know that the cooperator’s name is, for example, “John Smith.”
A way to increase public oversight without triggering fears of retaliation
would be to organize the information differently, outside of the confines of
a criminal case file with a specific defendant’s name on it. Rather than
sealing, redacting, or otherwise obscuring the terms of the cooperation
bargain, it would be more helpful to disclose all cooperation agreements
with the explicit terms of the bargain intact but the personal identifying
information redacted. What I have in mind is a system of anonymous
defendant profiles, which could be organized by the type of crime charged
and then could include a statement of initial charges, all subsequent and
superseding charges, plea documents, an indication of whether the
defendant cooperated, and if so, the substance of his cooperation, and
sentencing information. If the defendant did cooperate, the cooperation
could be sorted into one of four general categories: providing background
information, agreeing to testify, providing testimony, or taking an active
part in the investigation.9
In this way, the computerization of the federal courts could give the
government an opportunity to shed light on its practices without a massive
loss of individual privacy.
JUDGE MERRYDAY: Thank you very much.
Criminal defense attorney and Professor at Brooklyn Law School, Gerald
Shargel.
9. This proposal is described in greater detail in Caren Myers Morrison, Privacy,
Accountability, and the Cooperating Defendant: Towards a New Role for Internet Access to
Court Records, 62 VAND. L. REV. 921, 974–76 (2009).
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PROF. SHARGEL: Thank you. Good afternoon.
In a system that celebrates transparency, I do not think that sealing is
appropriate in the case of cooperators. Not only is it not appropriate, I do
not think it accomplishes anything. The idea that people learn that a
particular person is a cooperator online, whether it is on ECF or PACER or
Whosarat.com, is nonsense. People learn that someone is a cooperator
because they know about the case and they know generally what has
happened to the defendant. A sealed proceeding is an advertisement that
the person is cooperating. So is a delay. It is usually obvious within hours
or days that someone is cooperating. As I have said, it is like Thanksgiving
dinner. When one of the relatives is absent, you know something is wrong.
The same is true in a multi-defendant criminal case: when one of the
defendants is absent or someone that is part of the gang is not charged or
sentence is delayed for two, three, four years or more, you know something
is terribly wrong.
There is one other thing that flies in the face of sealing the information
pertaining to a cooperator—and let me make this clear. If someone makes a
deal with the government and goes in, sometimes under cover of night, and
pleads guilty, I am not suggesting that the plea minutes not be sealed. I am
not suggesting that any information pertaining to the cooperator not be
sealed. But I am suggesting that it would be unconstitutional for the
sentencing proceeding itself to be sealed. The Supreme Court has said
recently, back in January of this year, in Presley v. Georgia,10 that the
public has a qualified First Amendment right to know exactly what occurs
in a case.11
I use the example of Sammy Gravano, who received a sentence in the
Eastern District of New York of five years, having admitted to nineteen
murders and other related criminal activity.12 The public has an absolute
right to know why that happened. The source material for why that
happened would be the sentencing minutes and the comments of the judge
in imposing the sentence. If a lawyer stands before a sentencing judge and
makes an argument that that client was an important, effective, and essential
cooperator in rooting out a serious criminal organization, the public has the
right to see that—my point being that it is constitutionally wrong to think
about sealing these records.
There was a case in the Southern District of New York that went to the
Second Circuit where a district court judge decided, only for her own
convenience, to hold all sentencing proceedings and some guilty pleas in
the robing room, simply, as I said, for convenience. No reason was put on
the record. The Second Circuit reversed convictions in two companion

10.
11.
12.
TIMES,
1997).

130 S. Ct. 721 (2010).
See id. at 723–25.
Joseph P. Fried, Ex-Mob Underboss Given Lenient Term For Help as Witness, N.Y.
Sept. 27, 1994, at A1; see United States v. Gotti, 171 F.R.D. 19, 21–22 (E.D.N.Y.

70

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

cases that were reviewed by it.13 Once again, the court found that it was
unconstitutional.
I cannot imagine that there can be a blanket rule where courts were
permitted to make generalized findings that all records are sealed in the
cases of cooperating witnesses. It would never pass constitutional muster.
The danger of cooperation is not caused by posting the sentencing
proceeding online. The danger of cooperation is not posed by having the
sentencing proceeding as a public proceeding, which it is. Can we extend
the closed filing online and say that the sentencing proceeding is closed,
that the door should be closed and no one should be admitted, seal the
courtroom? I do not think there is anyone in the room who would suggest
that that is constitutional. I do not think there is anyone in the room that
would suggest that is appropriate in any way.
My point, very simply, is this: if sentencing is an open proceeding, it
should be available to the public, both in terms of entering the courtroom
and seeing what occurred on PACER or ECF or any website that wants to
pick it up. I think that cases like the Gravano case make absolutely clear
that when something completely out of the ordinary happens, the public has
a right to know why.
Moreover, I feel strongly that it is not the obligation of the judiciary, of
the court system, to protect witnesses or protect cooperators. I think it is
the obligation of the executive branch. I think it is the obligation of the
Bureau of Prisons or the Marshals Service, with its Witness Protection
Program, to engage in protecting its witnesses. There are mechanisms in
place. There are separation orders. This is a vast country, with a vast
network of prisons. Prisoners are routinely housed in places where a danger
does not present itself. There are special prisons that accommodate
cooperators. There are ways that the safety of a cooperator while in
prison—and, of course, out of prison as well, in the Witness Protection
Program—can and is effectively secured. The Marshals Service boasted of
the fact, and I think continues to boast of the fact, that anyone who stayed in
the program and followed its rules has never faced harm. There has never
been a murder or an assault of any kind. I know that was true up until
recent years, as long as that person stayed in the program.
This is the obligation of the executive branch. We have open court
proceedings in this country, and it cannot be a policy to take a particular
class of defendants and say, in those cases, we are going to seal.
Thank you.
JUDGE MERRYDAY: Thank you, Mr. Shargel.
Another vantage, no doubt, from the Criminal Chief, the United States
Attorney’s Office in the District of Maryland, Barbara Sale.
MS. SALE: Perhaps surprisingly, I agree with my colleague that
sentencing proceedings should not be sealed. That is perhaps the extent of
my agreement with him, however. And I thank the people who put this
program together for allowing a diversity of views.
13. See United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189, 201–03 (2d Cir. 2005).
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I come from the District of Maryland, where the primary office is in
Baltimore, which has one of the highest homicide rates in the country, I am
not proud to say. It is the home of the infamous Stop Snitching videos,
which were actually marketed DVDs, which exhorted people not to snitch
on other people and threatened harm to those who cooperated with law
enforcement. Stop Snitching II featured a little boy of about ten wielding a
gun. Baltimore is also a place where we have had a constant stream of
notorious, high-profile witness retaliation cases.
We had a hideous arson case some years back in which a family of seven
was burnt to death in their home because the mother was suspected—
suspected, merely—of having passed information to the police about
neighborhood narcotics transactions. We had another firebombing where
an older lady was burned out of her home for the same reason. These are
just citizens trying to clean up their neighborhoods and make them safer for
ordinary law-abiding people to live in.
We have more recently had cases involving deliberate first-degree
murders of people who were believed to be cooperating in criminal cases.
We had a case last year in which a person who was awaiting trial on a
homicide learned from a witness list that a particular person, whose name
was not theretofore known to him, was expected to be a witness. This
happened to be a key witness, but he was a bystander, just somebody who
just happened to be there and see something and report it to the police. The
witness’s mother urged him not to get involved because she had heard
about the dangers faced by witnesses to inner-city crime. From his prison
cell, using a smuggled cell phone, the defendant put together a network of
gang members, who together gunned this man down in his front yard in
front of his four-year-old child.
In this climate, we have to take every precaution we can to protect those
who want to come forward and cooperate with the prosecution. It is not
easy.
My colleague here says that the Marshals Service has a record of
protecting people one hundred percent, but that speaks only to the formal
WitSec program, in which witnesses are given new identities and relocated.
In the real world, very few are admitted to that program, and even those
who are often choose to go back to the neighborhoods that they come from.
We had a case a year ago where a protected witness went home on
Thanksgiving Day. He was supposed to be in witness protection, but he
went home to see his mom for Thanksgiving, and was gunned down a block
from her house because he was believed to be cooperating.
I do not need to tell horror stories for the rest of the afternoon, but they
are real, and they happen, day in and day out.
There are two consequences to this in our federal court system.
Maryland was among the last to go to electronic case filing in criminal
cases because our Chief Judge and some of the key players were very wary
about what would happen. We finally bit the bullet and, in August 2008,
went to electronic case filing in criminal cases, but only after the public
defender and I, and one of the judges, and a representative of the private
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criminal defense bar sat down for months to try to figure out how best to
protect cooperating witnesses. We adopted what has come to be known as
the North Dakota plan. This means that whenever somebody pleads guilty,
there are two documents that are filed on PACER. One of them is simply a
plea agreement. It lays out all the things that you need for a plea
agreement—the elements of the offense and the maximum penalty and the
rights that the defendant is giving up and that sort of thing. Then there is
filed in every case a “sealed supplement.” If the person is not cooperating,
the sealed supplement simply says, “This is not a cooperation agreement.”
If the person is cooperating, it lays out in three or four pages the whole
litany of expectations and obligations that go with the cooperation
agreement. So anybody looking at the docket from outside on PACER
would see that all plea agreements look exactly the same, and only by
gaining access to the sealed supplement—and people do move to unseal
from time to time—could somebody determine that Person A was
cooperating, whereas Person B was not.
This seems to have been effective. The defense bar is very happy with it
because they feel that it protects their clients. But that seems to have
resolved itself. As we stand now, we are confident that we are doing what
we can to protect cooperating defendants from exposure as they move
through the system.
There are several points throughout the system where this becomes
important. Early on in the case you may need to protect the identity of the
cooperators to protect an ongoing investigation. You might think that after
they have testified at trial, it is all out in the open and there is no longer any
need to protect them. But it turns out that there is a continuing need to
avoid identifying cooperating witnesses on paper. Judges that I work with
and people in my office have gotten letters from cooperators in prison
begging them to send some kind of phony court document so that they can
show it to their new colleagues in prison to prove that they are not snitches,
that they are not cooperators. It is not simply that a person is endangered
by cooperating in a particular case. It turns out that being a “snitch” is a
status that sticks to people throughout their incarcerations, and—who
knows?—maybe beyond, which puts them at risk. So we have had people
ask to have phony judgment and commitment orders, or phony plea
agreements that show that they are not cooperating.
Of course, the court cannot do that and we cannot do that. The public
defender in our district has generated letters to former clients saying, “It is
too bad you elected not to cooperate. I could have gotten you a better
deal”—wink, wink. Presumably, they can show this around, and it may
protect them.
It turns out that paper, something that is actually in black and white, is
important to people in prisons and in the criminal community on the street
who are trying to determine who is and who is not a cooperator. We are
investigating a case right now where an FBI 302 report of investigation was
circulated as proof that the victim was cooperating. That 302 report had
been turned over in discovery, and copies were located in four penal
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institutions in three states. The witness was, again, gunned down in his
home neighborhood.
For now, I am not suggesting any global policy solution. Our solution of
having a sealed supplement in every case seems to be working. Others
have suggested the Southern District of New York solution of having the
plea agreement remain in the prosecutor’s file and never made a part of the
court record. I think each district is going to have to work its way through
these issues separately. I take Judge Raggi’s point that everybody is
looking for a carve-out here. We certainly are. We would like to have
cooperators not exposed on the public record in perpetuity and endangered
by having their status as witnesses on PACER.
Thank you.
JUDGE MERRYDAY: Thank you, Barbara.
From the Intelligence Operations Office of the Bureau of Prisons,
Christopher Brown.
MR. BROWN: Good afternoon.
I just want to take a couple of minutes to talk about what happens to
inmates once they are received inside a federal prison with the tag as a
“snitch” or a “rat.” I can tell you from experience that one of the things that
happens right away is that other inmates seek to find out why they are there.
What I mean by that is, once an inmate is received at a federal prison—I
basically call them the welcoming committee. These are the inmates who
attempt to be your friends, just to find out why you are there, what your
case is all about. What they are actually trying to find out is if this person
can be trusted or not. The way they do that is, they want to see your presentence investigative report or your statement of reason—just something to
say you did not cooperate with the government and you did not take a plea
to basically rat out others.
The Bureau of Prisons does do a good job—as well as the Marshals—in
keeping these individuals safe. However, one of the problems that we are
faced with is, once an inmate has been outed as being a rat or a snitch, what
to do with him. Once we find out that the inmate has been compromised—
and I am not talking about inmates that are in the Witness Protection
Program. I am just talking about the average inmate who, for whatever his
reasons were, decided to take a plea and he named his codefendants and he
received a reduced sentence.
The Bureau of Prisons tries to keep these inmates within 500 miles of
their home. However, that is not always possible. First and foremost is the
inmate’s safety. Once this inmate steps foot inside the institution, if this
inmate cannot produce some sort of documentation that says that he did not
cooperate or take a plea, then he is basically ostracized for whatever time
that he has to do. No other inmates want to befriend him. The only other
inmates that receive this type of treatment are child molesters. We read
about it, we talk about it, we see it on television, but it is real. These
inmates basically do their time in isolation.
Let’s talk a couple of minutes about assaults. They are assaulted. They
are harassed pretty much on a daily basis. Basically, what can be done?
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We can move them from prison to prison, but some of the intelligence of
that inmate is passed on from institution to institution. Just like this inmate
is transferred to another institution, so are others. It is almost like they have
their own underground network.
The Bureau of Prisons does not allow these documents inside the prison,
but the inmates are allowed to review them. However, they are not allowed
to keep them in their possession. When I listen to the stories about the
inmates asking for fake documentation, I have firsthand experience where
inmates have basically asked me the same question: “How do I go about
getting fake documentation? I am receiving pressure on the yard to produce
some type of documentation that says that I am not a cooperator.”
What happens from that point on is, we have to assess whether or not we
can keep that inmate in the same institution or whether we are going to
break our own rule of 500 miles, which is really an unwritten rule, and send
that inmate somewhere where he will be safe.
Not only is the inmate in danger, sometimes his family members are in
danger. I have had inmates tell me that individuals in their community
want to see their pre-sentence investigation report. Somebody in their
family will show it to someone in the community, who will verify the
information and then get the word back into the prison that this person is
okay or this person cannot be trusted.
The Bureau of Prisons recognizes that this is a problem. In 2002, what
the Bureau of Prisons did was to basically let all inmates know that they can
no longer have access to these materials. Simply telling an inmate, “You
cannot have these materials, but do not talk about your case”—there are
1800 other inmates there. You have to talk to someone. You cannot spend
ten, twelve years in a federal prison and not try to fit in with someone.
There also was the issue of moving them to other prisons where they will
be less susceptible to harm. That is something that we try to do. We still
try to keep them close enough so they can maintain family ties. However,
that is not always possible. A lot of things depend on whether or not that
inmate will stay close to home—basically, the security level of that inmate.
We may not have a facility close by.
Sometimes the inmate will feel, “What did I get for cooperating? I get
harassed daily. I have been assaulted. And to add insult to injury, I am
being moved away from my family, where they can only come and visit me
once a year.”
We are addressing issues with inmates. However, one of the biggest
problems that we face inside the prison is getting the inmates to actually
come forward. More often than not, the inmate who has been assaulted will
not tell you he has been assaulted. It is usually a situation where they say
they were injured doing a sports activity. If there were no witnesses to what
the event was, there is no way we can go forward and investigate, when an
inmate swears under oath that he was not assaulted.
My last point, and one of the issues that we are also addressing, is that
the inmates know that once they are assaulted and they admit to being
assaulted, they are going to be moved. They want to know how much time
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they are going to spend in the special housing unit under twenty-three-hour
lockdown. They cooperated. They were assaulted, harassed. Now they are
locked down for twenty-three hours a day, and they are going to be moved
somewhere away from home.
Those issues are currently being addressed. We are doing the best we
can. My personal opinion is that access to records—it is an issue where
inmates know, once they step inside the prison, that they have done
something wrong and their safety is basically going to be up to them. We
do provide the best security we can for them. However, we cannot be
everywhere at once. We do ask them to cooperate with us. Sometimes they
do, sometimes they do not. But I do not think limiting access to records
will really help us at all, the issue being that the information that the other
inmates receive is information that can be found just about anywhere.
Thank you.
JUDGE MERRYDAY: Thank you, Christopher.
A former United States Attorney and now an attorney with Covington &
Burling, Alan Vinegrad.
MR. VINEGRAD: Thank you.
I start from the presumption, which is a safe one, because I think it has
been endorsed by the Supreme Court of the United States,14 that there
should presumptively be a qualified First Amendment right of access—to
be specific, to criminal proceedings, including plea agreements.15 My
general view on this issue is that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
and the case law that has developed surrounding the issue of sealing
criminal proceedings or documents relating to them provide sufficient legal
authority for case-by-case fact-specific determinations of when that
presumptive right of access should be overridden.
The safety of witnesses is obviously an important consideration. Not
having ongoing government investigations compromised is obviously a
valid interest and consideration. In fact, it may be such that in a particular
case it justifies denying public access to cooperation agreements, not just
electronically, but even in hard copy from a courthouse.
But I caution against a categorical approach because even with
cooperators—I am putting aside people who simply plead guilty (I think
there is less of a concern about confidentiality for them)—I think a hard and
fast rule that shields their agreements or sentencing proceedings from
public view is hard to justify, the prime example being cases in which the
cooperation of those defendants becomes publicly known, either at the time
of their plea or the time that they testify in open court at a trial, or even
earlier. To pick one recent notorious case, the longtime chief financial
officer who worked for Bernard Madoff pled guilty several months ago,

14. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
15. See id. at 510–12.
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pursuant to a cooperation agreement.16 I think the fact that he was
cooperating became publicly and widely known even before he entered his
plea.
So I am hard-pressed to envision a rule that would deny the public
access, electronically or otherwise, to the terms and conditions of his
cooperation agreement. It is hard to see what higher value, from the lawenforcement perspective, is being served there. And so I do question this
all-or-nothing approach, where either we grant access electronically or
otherwise categorically to plea and cooperation agreements or we do not.
Obviously, there are competing considerations here. That is why we are
all sitting in this room right now talking about it. But having said that, I
would make just a couple of brief points.
One is, I do question the efficacy of what will be achieved ultimately by
having varying levels of access to these types of agreements, either going to
the courthouse to get them in hard-copy form or electronically, again as a
categorical matter that says you can get it one way, but not the other. I
think it is a challenge to see the meaningful, principled, constitutional
difference that would support different rules for one versus the other. It
seems to me that, in this day and age, with lots of enterprising people and
organizations out there who amass data and information and documents,
especially in our electronic age, equal access basically just avoids the
necessity of having a so-called cottage industry of those who would gather
this information anyway and make it public or sell it to persons and make it
electronically available.
I could take a more cynical approach and say that basically, while I
completely understand and agree with many of the concerns that Barbara
Sale articulated earlier from the law enforcement perspective, it seems to
me that in a great majority of cases, those who are bound and determined to
make mischief with a cooperating defendant are going to be able to do that,
whether the cooperation agreement is electronically available on PACER or
not, whether they take the time to go to the courthouse and get it or get
somebody to go get it. Or, I think as is more typically the case, as Gerry
Shargel mentioned before, the people who have the greatest interest in
finding out who the cooperators are and who may want to make mischief
are going to figure it out anyway, through the normal course of events in a
criminal case.
So, while I think the concerns are valid, I do not know what is really
accomplished by denying electronic access. I would say the same about
Mr. Brown’s comments with regard to what happens in the Bureau of
Prisons. I will not repeat it, but he basically said it at the end of his
remarks. I do not know what sealing or denying electronic access
accomplishes or does to solve the many problems that confront cooperators
in prison. In fact, if I can plagiarize my former colleague Caren Myers
16. See Transcript of Plea at 8, 40-41, United States v. DiPascali, No. 09 CR 764 (RJS)
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2009); Jack Healy & Diana B. Henriques, A Madoff Aide, Guilty,
Reveals Scheme Details, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2009, at A1.
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Morrison’s article, which is excellent on this topic, I think I question the
severity of the risk, not posed by cooperation generally, but by electronic
access to the sorts of documents we are talking about here, where there are
organizations that have had a field day making these documents available,
and virtually no documented instances of retaliation have resulted.17
There are districts that have come up with creative solutions, I think, to
these problems. I think the creativity comes with concerns of its own. I
will just mention two, and then I will be done.
One is the notion of filing generic plea agreements that all contain these
generic cooperation provisions even for non-cooperators, which seems to
me troubling from a public “right to know” perspective because what the
public is getting is misleading information. So, too, I think one has to look
hard at a practice well known to me—I hope the Chief Judge from my old
district does not take my head off for saying this—of having plea or
cooperation agreements not actually filed with the court, and therefore
avoiding, frankly, the types of requirements that are embedded within our
Rules of Criminal Procedure and our case law. I think there is a tension
between that practice, on the one hand, and the notion that criminal matters
and dispositions should be subject to public scrutiny.
Thank you.
JUDGE MERRYDAY: Thank you, Alan. From the Federal Defenders
of New York, Jan Rostal.
MS. ROSTAL: Thank you, and thanks to the subcommittee for bringing
out all these views.
I speak on behalf of the constituency my office represents, which is the
indigent defendants in the Southern and Eastern District court system (we
represent some 2500 indigent defendants a year). No one pays a lot of
attention to my clients, including the press, which does not have a lot of
interest in them. They are not the Bernie Madoffs, they are not the cases
that the press really cares about or deems newsworthy.
I have to say, thinking about their cases, and thinking about the advice I
have to give a client when he or she is deciding whether to cooperate, one
of the questions I get is obviously how much time they are going to get.
But the other is: what is it going to mean? Who is going to hear the details
of my case and my life? What is it going to mean in the Bureau of Prisons?
What is it going to mean when I get deported, as many of my clients will, to
the Dominican Republic, Colombia, or Mexico? What is electronically
available in other countries? What is my family going to be able to see?
What are the enemies of my family going to be able to see?
Those are obvious and fair questions. Clients are being asked to
cooperate by law enforcement, by U.S. Attorney’s Offices, and being told
that everything is being done to try to protect them. They are told maybe
they will not have to testify, maybe their cooperation will never be made
known to the public. Yet, under the current system of free electronic

17. See Morrison, supra note 9, at 956–58 (discussing www.whosarat.com).
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access, somebody out there Googling can get it, regardless of whether there
is any true public interest in disclosure of the information.
This seems backwards to me. On behalf of my clients, I have to say, I
fall with what I hope is going to be dubbed the “Professor Morrison rule,”
which is that the problem is not so much in the sealing or unsealing, it is in
the unfettered electronic access. It seems to me that if there is going to be a
presumption, why wouldn’t the presumption be in favor of limiting the
electronic access to parties and to the court, probation officers, pretrial
officers, other people with an institutional need to know? If there is a case
of public interest, a Bernie Madoff kind of situation for example, or any
other case of a newsworthy level, let the press or parties come in and ask for
the access and then weigh all these competing interests. Why mess with it
from the get-go and put my (no offense to them) less newsworthy when
there is no one interested in their proverbial tree falling in the woods?
There should be a concern for the folks whom I represent, who, for the
most part, have given up their freedom. Part of the bargain was not
necessarily giving up their privacy, and not just whether they cooperated,
but in sentencing submissions, what diseases they have, what learning
disabilities their children have, what medications they are on, whether they
did or did not give post-arrest statements when they were arrested. Maybe
that does not rise to the level of cooperation, but who knows how that is
going to play back home?
There are already too many personal details of clients’ lives getting
revealed in electronic systems, details that are not newsworthy, and that
nobody really seems to care about, except for more sinister reasons. If there
is an interest in those details, that interest it seems to me, can be protected
by making the press or those who have the interest take the steps to get
access to the information and show why they care, even if that is just going
to check out the courthouse file the old-fashioned way. I object to the
Facebook-ization of ECF and PACER.
Thank you.
JUDGE MERRYDAY: Thank you, Jan. Our final but not least panelist
is Cris Arguedas, a criminal defense attorney. Cris?
MS. ARGUEDAS: Thank you. I am a criminal defense attorney. I
started as a federal public defender, and I still do a lot of indigent work. I
think this is a pretty complicated subject, actually.
My position is that the First Amendment requires that shutting out the
public should be viewed as a drastic step, and it should be taken in as
narrow a way as possible. I think that is probably kind of unassailable. The
question is, how do you do that?
I think one needs to look at where the danger is from. It is, I think we all
agree, from the people in the system. It is from your codefendants, your
potential codefendants, or your prison mates. It is not from the public,
basically. We now have a situation where all of these various versions of
sealing very effectively do shut the public out of knowing what is going on,
and they do not at all effectively stop your codefendants, potential
codefendants, and housemates in the prison from knowing what is going on.
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So we have done a very dramatic thing that is aimed at the wrong section
and that implicates the First Amendment.
I also think that there are some real dangers over the fact that we have
such radically different procedures going on in each district of our federal
courts. I want to just identify how different they are. One could argue that
these are examples from a menu, so everyone could choose which one
sounds good to them. And it does show flexibility in the federal system—
always a good thing, I think. But the other thing is, it is quite chaotic, and it
gives a lot of mixed messages that could be exactly misinterpreted by the
people whom we are supposed to be protecting these cooperators from.
For example, in many districts, it is the way it always was. Plea
agreements are filed and they are put on PACER, and that is where they are,
unless I, when I am representing the cooperator, move to seal them. If I
move to seal them, it is always granted and it is sealed. Then everyone in
the system knows: sealed means cooperation. Right? So the public gets to
know kind of nothing, but the flag is up for all the people who are
dangerous to my client.
We have the Northern District of California, San Francisco. They have
no plea agreements available on PACER at all. PACER shows a plea was
entered. But if you go to the courthouse, you can see it all on paper, unless
it is sealed, in which case, again, the public does not get to know what
happened, but the people who are dangerous do.
You have the District of New Hampshire, in which every plea agreement
has boilerplate language in it that says if the defendant gives valuable
assistance and cooperates, the government will make a 5K1 motion.18 You
put that in every plea agreement, whether you are cooperating or not. This
is supposed to be protecting someone from danger? I would not want to be
the person at Lompoc [Federal Correctional Complex], who is saying, “Oh,
no. They put it in everybody’s. It is a way of camouflage.” Does this
make sense to anybody?
The District of North Dakota: they file a basic plea agreement. It never
says you are cooperating. Then every case files something separate, which
is under seal and says “Plea Agreement Supplement.” My plea agreement
supplement, which is under seal, might say I am cooperating. The other
one says, not in these words, “This is just a camouflage document. I am not
cooperating at all, and we do not even need this thing here, except it is here
so that it hides the guys that are cooperating.”
Again, I think that is pretty much a big deception. It should not be what
our courts are doing. But also, if you are a San Francisco hoodlum and you
see a sealed document from North Dakota, that means snitch in San
Francisco and in a lot of places. So I do not even think it is very good
camouflage.
18. A 5K1 motion is a “motion of the government stating that the defendant has
provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has
committed an offense.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2009). When the
government makes a 5K1 motion, the court may depart from the sentencing guidelines. See
id.
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The Eastern District of Pennsylvania: they are like the Northern District
[of California], but they refuse to put on paper everything that has to do
with a criminal case. Nothing from the criminal case is there—not the plea,
not the motions, not the sentencing documents, not anything.
Then we have the Northern District of Illinois, which I think has been
described, which says that the criminal case, all of it, is accessible to the
lawyers, basically, to the people involved in the case. So the public is
entirely shut out of that. In my opinion, most of the time, in most of the
cases, the people who are dangerous know who is snitching and who is not.
So what has happened in the Northern District of Illinois is that nobody in
Chicago gets to know what is happening in their federal criminal cases.
That seems to me to be a serious abrogation of the First Amendment.
But my main message here is that we should be aware that there may be
ninety different ways of doing this. It is because the various courts have
decided this is the best way to protect their people. I appreciate, from
Maryland, what your point is. But we cannot be so parochial, I do not
think. What you may think is protection, I might think is a red flag based
on the way my district does it. So it seems to me that at least there should
be some guidelines and then exceptions, as always.
JUDGE MERRYDAY: Thank you, Cris.
Christopher, you were talking about the incidents in the Bureau of
Prisons. Does the Bureau of Prisons compile data to determine the number
of those and make any effort to categorize them by severity and cause?
MR. BROWN: We do collect data. But basically right now the only
thing that we do is treat it as an assault. We do not categorize and say, this
was an assault based on cooperation. That was one of the things that was
brought up during the telephone conference. I did bring that up to my
superiors. It would make it easier for us to track if we did have a system,
not just saying it was a simple assault or a serious assault, if we broke it
down to say it was because of cooperation.
JUDGE MERRYDAY: And you might have a problem with the
credibility of your source for that information, as far as making a judgment
about what it actually was. Some people would tell you that, I suppose, to
divert your attention away from the real cause.
MR. BROWN: Yes, they do.
JUDGE MERRYDAY: Does the Department of Justice do that,
Barbara? Do you know?
MS. SALE: Compile information about the reason for the assault? No.
JUDGE MERRYDAY: If a threat is made on a judge, the United States
Marshals do a threat analysis, and they give it a rating and decide whether
you will receive protection. I was wondering if the Department of Justice
does that with respect to its witnesses or cooperators.
MS. SALE: It may be done with respect to witnesses who have been
admitted to the Witness Protection Program because that is such a high
level of protection. As Gerry mentioned, there are, I believe, four prisons
where everybody in the prison is a cooperator. Presumably the risk level is
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a little bit lower there. But for the vast number of people—and I think
probably thirty percent of our cases in the District of Maryland involve
making 5K1 recommendations,19 and that is a lot of defendants—there is no
threat assessment that follows them.
We do, as you mentioned earlier, separation memoranda to the Bureau of
Prisons and say that Gerry should not be with Cris, and so forth. There is
only so much they can do. When you have a case that has thirty-seven
individual cases—and some of these gang cases are just, as you all know,
unwieldy and huge—there is only so much you can do to keep people
separated. I think some people just live on buses, getting moved around to
BOP [Bureau of Prisons] facilities.
MR. BROWN: One of the things I want to clarify is, when you talk
about threat assessments, we do complete threat assessments on inmates
who have been threatened. Generally, we have thirty days to complete a
threat assessment. At the end, we have to verify it or un-verify it. That
stays as a part of that inmate’s permanent record, no matter where they go,
that a threat assessment was completed on that inmate.
JUDGE MERRYDAY: It seems that, at least in one sense, what we are
doing here is deciding what risk to encounter and on whose behalf.
Evaluating that is made particularly difficult if you do not have reliable data
on how frequently this happens, how severe it is, what the source was, and
whether there is, actually, anything you can do about it one way or the
other.
JUDGE RAGGI: I have two questions, one for those of you who have
supported removing criminal cases from the electronic filing and then one
for those of you who think that is problematic.
To the former, as a rules committee, we can only implement
congressional legislation. I am not sure that your proposal can be
reconciled with the E-Government Act.20 Is that right? Is this an argument
for Congress rather than for a judiciary committee? Or are you urging
something by the judiciary itself?
PROF. MORRISON: I am urging action by the judiciary itself, through
its supervisory power over its own records. It is true that some of the
tactics used in certain districts, such as the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
which provides no Internet access to criminal court records at all, seem as if
they might fall afoul of the E-Government Act. But to my knowledge, no
court has yet interpreted the E-Government Act as limiting the discretion of
the judiciary to manage its own records. Congress has directed each federal
court to maintain a website containing public information on its files,
including docket sheets, but it could be argued that it gave substantial
deference to the courts as to what information to provide. It is possible that
a system that took docket sheets and court records offline but then provided
detailed information in the aggregate would satisfy the requirements of the
Act.
19. See id.
20. 44 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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JUDGE RAGGI: For those of you who are more inclined to see this
done ad hoc as individual cases may need attention, we are about to hear
from a panel of judges who use some of the diverse means that you have
talked about. There has been some question about whether the Privacy
Committee should take a stand on any of these particular practices or view
it as beneficial for individual districts to work out what suits their particular
culture best. Does anyone want to speak to the issue of whether we ought
to recognize certain best practices or encourage diversification?
PROF. SHARGEL: I think it is problematic if you have an ad hoc
approach. I think that is just too difficult. I think there has to be some
symmetry. It is either going to be one way or another.
Another problem that you face is that all these plans have been
implemented, and yet seemingly there has not been any challenge to the
plans. Several panel members have been talking about the constitutional
requirements of the First Amendment, yet none of these plans or programs
have faced a First Amendment challenge. It would be interesting to see
what happens if they do.
It would seem to me that it should be symmetrical. I think it should be
uniform. I do not think it should be a catch-as-catch-can approach, with
local rules in each district. But I think that the serious issue will be
determined when someone, sooner or later—probably an institutional
litigant like Federal Defenders—brings a First Amendment challenge.
MS. ARGUEDAS: To me, the salient point is that the most dangerous
population, in terms of who is going to do the beating-up and killing of
people, is in the federal prisons. They come from all the different districts,
and so they are misinterpreting, or perhaps correctly interpreting, these
different signals from the different places. So I think it has to be pretty
uniform—not without some flexibility on a case-by-case basis. But I think
we have to act like a federal system, since we are sending them to federal
prisons.
MR. VINEGRAD: I think the rules currently provide both a general rule
of application that people can follow and also an ability of courts, based on,
not so much custom and practices, but particular problems in a particular
district or case, to make a case-by-case determination of what falls within
that standard. Rule 49.121 has a good-cause standard now for limiting
electronic remote access to documents, and good cause may vary between
New York and North Dakota as to what meets that standard. It is not all
that different than what courts do all the time, which is apply a standard to
the particular facts of a case and come up with their body of law for what is
going to fly in terms of a request for confidentiality and what is not.
PROF. SHARGEL: Also, if I may, I do not think we should walk away
from this meeting with the notion that there is an inexorable path from
electronic filing to trouble in prison or trouble on the street. Trouble in
prison happens in all sorts of ways. I have heard several times of people
working in the prison offices actually selling information contained in
21. FED. R. CRIM. P. 49.1.
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private probation reports that are in the offices and alerting other prisoners
that an inmate is cooperating. Stopping electronic filing is not going to
solve that problem. On the street there are similar ways that lead to trouble
and danger to cooperators or potential cooperators.
Keep in mind, the troublemakers, the killers, the vicious people do not
have a proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. They do not even need
probable cause. Mere suspicion has resulted in the deaths of many
cooperators and people who actually were not cooperating.
We are here talking about a small segment of a potential problem, a
problem with constitutional implications. That is why, once again, I look
back to the executive branch to resolve this.
JUDGE MERRYDAY: On behalf of Judge Raggi and the Standing
Committee, thank you all for participating in this panel.

